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Abstract 
 
In October 2011, HM Prison Birmingham was transferred from public to private management, under 
G4S. This was the first time that an existing operational public prison was privatised in the UK. The move 
marked the third and most far reaching phase of prison privatisation policy, and was intended both to 
increase quality of life for prisoners, from a low baseline, and to reduce costs. Prior to 2011, private 
prisons had all been new-builds. Private contractors had thus far avoided the additional challenges of 
inheriting a pre-existing workforce and operating in old, often unsuitable, buildings. This article reports 
on a longitudinal evaluation of the complex process of the transition, and some outcomes for both staff 
and prisoners. As an experiment in the reorganisation of work and life in a ‘traditional’ public sector 
prison, the exercise was unprecedented, has set the agenda for future transformations. The example 
illustrates the intense, distinctive and rapidly changing nature of penality as it makes itself felt in the 
lived prison experience, and raises important questions about the changing use of State power. 
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David Garland suggests that in order to explain penality, scholars should ‘attend more closely to the 
structure and organisation of the penal state’ (2010, p. 476) and that we should focus more 
systematically on governmental and legal processes, particularly in explaining penal change. We agree 
wholeheartedly. Noel Whitty has described prison scholars as ‘law avoidant’ (Murphy & Whitty, 2016). 
Other criminologists have made similar observations (A Bottoms, personal communication) and have 
also called for more attention to be paid to the complex relationship between state power, rules and 
behaviour (for example, Dixon, 1997 and Baldwin & Kinsey, 1985 in policing). Changing legal and other 
structural frameworks are impacting deeply and swiftly on prison leadership, life, culture and quality in 
England and Wales (more deeply and swiftly then elsewhere, we propose1) with insufficient attention 
being paid to their purposes or effects. Privatisation and competition are the most obvious areas where 
the law, or formal ‘deployment of the power to punish’ has changed (Garland, 2010, p. 21), but other 
associated changes to the terms and conditions of imprisonment (e.g., benchmarking/cost reductions, 
changing performance measurement requirements, and the building of larger prisons) are also making a 
significant impact. These are ‘sociologically significant activities’ (Power, 1997) with serious implications 
for models of penal order, for the ways in which power works, staff operate, and prisoners live, in 
prison, as well as for outcomes. This case study suggests that we should add to Garland’s ambitious 
research agenda close and empirical-longitudinal scrutiny of single sites as they adapt, imperfectly and 
with much strain, to the changing penal field. The intense, distinctive and rapidly changing nature of 
penality shows up, often dramatically, in the prison experience. Our analyses should be focused both on 
day-to-day accounts of ‘how punishment feels’ and state action. The shape and tone of prison life is 
being energetically crafted by state actors, not always competently (Le Vay, 2016), with some intended 
and many unintended effects on those who are subjected to it. 
 
The changing penal state: the case for privatising public prisons 
 
In a Report into the state and use of prisons, the House of Commons Home Affairs Committee (HAC) 
identified a series of well-known problems facing public sector prisons (HAC, 1987a): aged buildings, 
overcrowding, high costs and hostile industrial relations. This Report was swiftly followed by a second, 
highly influential HAC Report on the Contract Provision of Prisons, in which the Committee called for 
‘urgent new ways’ of tackling these difficulties and recommended, ‘as an experiment’, the use of the 
private sector to construct and manage new prisons (HAC, 1987b).  
 
Four years later, as the first private prison was due to open, Martin Narey, then Chief Executive of the 
Prison Service, linked the failings of public sector prisons to morality. At a Prison Governors’ conference 
in 2001, he said: 
 
I am not prepared to continue to apologise for failing prison after failing prison. I’ve had enough of 
trying to explain the very immorality of our treatment of some prisoners […]. We have to decide, as a 
Service, whether this litany of failure and moral neglect continues indefinitely […]. It’s a matter of 
caring, a matter of determination, and, I accept, not a little courage in taking on a culture in all too 
many places which we have allowed to decay […]. The prize is […] a Prison Service of which we need 
no longer be ashamed (Narey, 2001, p. 3). 
 
The existence of ‘failing prisons’ was a problem of courage and care as well as management 
competence. The private sector was invited to lead urgent reform, and public sector Governors were 
challenged to follow suit. Complex arguments about the ethical risks of punishing for profit, as well as 
arguments over variations in, and measurement of, performance in the public sector, were side-stepped 
as the moral case for cultural and management improvements to prison operations took hold in a 
                                              
1 Although many jurisdictions, including Australian States, are following suit. 
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political context of deep commitment to a ‘New Public Management’ agenda (Hood, 1991; Ascher, 1987; 
Harding, 2001). 
 
Some of the problems holding back change in the public sector were due to the resistance of the Prison 
Officer’s Association (POA), the trade union representing most prison staff. Whilst prison culture and 
quality varied significantly, many public sector prisons – particularly those in large inner cities – were 
characterised by negative and reluctant staff cultures, neglectful regimes and practices, and high costs. 
The reasons for these failings were complex, and a programme of management reform including better 
performance measurement had begun. Privatisation was advocated for ideological reasons as well as a 
source of improvement, innovation and competition: a spur to greater efficiency and better 
performance across the board.  
 
The privatisation ‘experiment’ started with management-only contracts, and checks on the devolution 
and control of delegated powers. Under s.85 of the Criminal Justice Act 1991, a private prison Director 
was not empowered to conduct any disciplinary hearings against prisoners and generally could not order 
the removal of a prisoner from association with other prisoners, order the temporary confinement of a 
prisoner in a special cell or order the application to a prisoner of any special control or restraint. These 
functions were instead fulfilled by a Controller; a state employed contract monitor and adjudicator (see 
further James, Bottomley, Liebling & Clare, 1997). However, the ‘experiment’ quickly developed to 
include longer contracts incorporating the financing, design, and management of establishments, and 
many of the original constraints on the powers of Directors were loosened (see Ludlow, 2012).  
 
In the years that followed, 11 private prisons were opened, and a series of competitions for existing 
prisons were held. The public sector retained one contested prison in this first round (HMP Manchester), 
and won one back from the private sector (HMP Buckley Hall). At some establishments (such as the Isle 
of Sheppey prison cluster in 2005), internal performance improvement processes were used rather than 
competitive tendering. This provoked criticism from the Confederation of British Industry (CBI) on the 
grounds that expectations of new business had been raised.2 However, no bids came in at an affordable 
price for the first ‘traditional/ancient’ local prison placed on the market in 2001 (HMP Brixton). The 
constraints on potential bidders for HMP Brixton included employment law requiring the retention of 
staff on existing pay and conditions,3 and the limitations inherent in the prison’s dilapidated and 
unsuitable buildings. The prison was described in various reports as ‘brutal, squalid and chaotic’, and 
even its Governor described it as ‘inhuman and degrading’ and was ‘worse’ in 2001 than it was ‘in the 
70s’.4 Sickness absence among staff was high. As in other public sector prisons, improvements were 
overdue, but the competition was abandoned when the private sector could not be persuaded to bid for 
it. The prison has remained in the public sector since, with few signs of improvement to its basic 
conditions or culture to date, despite an improbable change of function to Category C/D resettlement 
prison in 2013 (e.g., HMCIP 2011; Crewe, Liebling & Hulley, 2014).  
  
Over the years to follow, the Government strengthened its formal commitment to prison competition. 
The National Offender Management Service (NOMS) was created, as an amalgamation of the former 
Prison and Probation Services. One of the aims of this restructuring was to improve the delivery of 
competition policies (Carter, 2003, 2007; Home Office, 2004). The powers of private prison Directors and 
the role of public sector Controllers were revised in favour of greater private sector responsibility by the 
Offender Management Act 2007. This signalled a new level of trust in private sector operators and sent a 
positive message to the market about the future role of private service delivery (Ludlow, 2012).  
 
                                              
2 http://www.ft.com/cms/s/0/2bc2a9ee-e905-11d9-87ea-00000e2511c8.html#axzz2HP4EqbZE.  
3 The Transfer of Undertakings (Protection of Employment) Regulations 2006. 
4 http://www.theguardian.com/society/2001/jan/31/prisonsandprobation. 
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During this period, evidence on the quality and cost of new privately managed prisons, and their effects 
on performance in the Service overall, was sparse, but somewhat promising in parts (e.g. NAO, 2003; 
HMCIP, 2002; Liebling with Arnold 2004; Shefer & Liebling, 2008) particularly in areas such as staff 
culture, and responsiveness to management requirements. The evidence was less positive in areas like 
safety and security (James et al., 1997; Liebling with Arnold, 2004). These studies precipitated an 
animated debate about how to measure relative cost and quality.  
 
Conceptualising and measuring prison quality 
 
In 2006, Liebling and Crewe secured a large Economic and Social Research Council (ESRC) research grant 
to conduct a project, Values, Practices and Outcomes in Public and Private Corrections. The study was 
shaped by previous research by both investigators on prison life and quality. Fieldwork comprised 
extensive survey data collection in two matched public and two private prisons, alongside interviews 
with over ninety senior managers in both sectors about their professional values, backgrounds and 
motivations.5 The prison quality survey developed for these purposes had its origins in earlier studies of 
what mattered to prisoners in measuring prison quality, and had been revised over the course of several 
specific investigations (for example, of prison suicide prevention; see Liebling et al., 2005). The survey 
has been adopted by NOMS since 2004 for routine use in all prisons, and in that capacity is known as 
‘Measuring the Quality of Prison Life’ (MQPL). 
 
The findings of Liebling and Crewe’s ESRC study can be summarised as follows: 
 
 There were significant differences between staff cultures in the two sectors. Even in struggling 
private sector establishments, staff reported feeling relatively safe and expressed high levels of 
trust in their managers. Relative to the public sector, uniformed staff were more positive about 
their work and their employers, despite less preferable salaries and conditions in the early 
stages.  
 
 Staff in public sector prisons were more likely to adhere to a ‘traditional’ or ‘heavy’ culture, 
which could be related to some negative consequences for prisoners, including feelings of 
unfairness and lack of care. On the other hand, experience was also related to a more positive 
‘traditional-professional’ orientation amongst many public sector prison staff, which prisoners 
welcomed. There were indications that a traditional (negative) culture was developing among 
uniformed staff in the more established and once higher-performing private sector 
establishments, as well as evidence of some benefits as more experience accrued. 
 
 While results gleaned from earlier studies suggested that the private sector might outperform 
the public sector in areas such as ‘decency’, ‘humanity’ and ‘trust’, the findings from the main 
four-prison comparison revealed higher scores in the public sector prisons than in the private 
sector prisons on a large number of dimensions, including ‘harmony’ (relational) as well as 
‘security’ dimensions, such as respect, staff-prisoner relationships; and staff use of authority, 
respectively. However, two of the private sector prisons added to the study obtained generally 
higher prisoner quality of life scores than all four prisons in the main study. These prisons were 
in many respects, outstanding. 
 
 Private sector prison staff struggled more than their public sector counterparts with the use of 
authority. Some private sector prison staff had a tendency to under-use power or use it in 
arbitrary ways. There was a tendency for under-policing, even in private sector establishments 
that were otherwise high-performing. In the two public sector prisons in the study, prisoners 
were more likely to describe officer power being used appropriately (that is, for order and 
                                              
5 Dr Susie Hulley and Ms Clare McLean also worked as part of the research team. 
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safety, as well as getting things done for prisoners), although there were indications that power 
was sometimes over-used.  
 
 A weakness of the private sector was staff knowledge and competence, particularly in longer-
term training prisons, where prisoners needed considerable assistance with sentence plans. 
Prisoners in private sector establishments described staff as ‘nice people’ but felt that they 
lacked expertise on issues that mattered to them, particularly in helping them to navigate 
through increasingly complex sentence conditions. Staff turnover was high. 
 
 Prisoners in the private sector prisons reported feeling more frustrated and stressed by their 
‘lighter’ but less organised prison experiences. Those in the public sector reported stronger 
feelings of being punished by their prison experience.  
 
These findings were conceptualised using the terms ‘heavy’ and ‘light’: public sector prisons tended to 
be ‘heavier’ – infused with authority, whereas private sector prisons tended to be ‘light’ and unsafe. 
Staff were sometimes ‘absent’, or insufficiently active in managing trouble (Crewe, Liebling & Hulley, 
2011, 2014). Better prisons combined the strengths and minimised the weaknesses of both sectors. In 
these better prisons, prisoners described feeling more able to work on their offending behaviour and 
personal development. 
 
There are grounds, then, for evaluating both public and private sector prisons closely, and for learning 
lessons about variations in approaches to staff recruitment, deployment and management following 
competition, and their effects. The privatisation of existing prisons, the new lean model being 
established in public sector prisons as they fight back, and the extensive contracting out of ‘services’ to 
prisoners, together mark a dramatically new phase in the prison management ‘experiment’. An intense, 
distinctive and rapidly changing form of penality is taking shape, and is having major effects on the 
experience of staff and prisoners, but to date this model has little ‘theory’ or evidence underpinning it. 
The authors of this article were both engaged, in different capacities, in research projects at the first 
existing and operational prison in England and Wales to be privatised (HMP Birmingham) during the 
prison’s competition and transition to G4S, as well as thereafter,6 and have been pursuing relevant 
changes in other prisons, with others, since. We draw on these projects to describe the transition 
process in particular, reflect on its significance, and outline the findings on the effects to date.  
 
A case study: the first public to private sector prison 
 
(i) The stakes  
 
In April 2009, when the competition for HMP Birmingham was announced, it was clear that this would 
be a ‘game changing’ competition. The announcement of further competition was not itself surprising. 
The Ministry of Justice had made a strong policy commitment to competition in its 2009 Capacity and 
Competition Policy. What made the announcement so noteworthy, then, was its potential to result in the 
first transfer of an operational public sector prison to the private sector in the UK. This had enormous 
workforce implications. As described above, prior to 2011, private UK prisons had all been new-builds 
and none of the competitions had resulted in a public prison being transferred to a private company.7 
                                              
6 For example, the direct invitation to lead a team evaluating its quality as perceived by prisoners and staff 
shortly after transition to G4S, and then one and two years later (Liebling et al., 2012, 2013, 2015); the 
supervision of an MPhil/PhD student exploring the use of User Voice at HMP Birmingham (amongst others) 
(Schmidt, 2013); and a PhD exploring the workforce implications of privatisation, using Birmingham as its key 
case study (Ludlow, 2015). 
7 There is precedent for such a transfer in Australia. The Parklea Correctional Complex in Western Sydney was 
taken into private management by GEO Group Australia on 31 October 2009. The terms and methods of 
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Private contractors had thus far avoided the additional challenges of inheriting a pre-existing workforce 
and operating in old, often unsuitable, buildings. If a private bidder was successful in the 2009 
competition, it would need to deliver savings and service improvement in unfamiliar territory. This 
would also signal an end to public sector confidence that they could resist new lean models of prison 
staff deployment. 
 
HMP Birmingham was put out to tender because of poor performance. It was one of the prisons named 
by Martin Narey in his ‘failing prisons’ speech. The prison shared many of the characteristics of HMP 
Brixton, the subject of the first abortive attempt at market testing an existing prison, described above. 
Birmingham is a large Victorian local that has a long history of reported brutality, ‘idleness and neglect’ 
(HMCIP, 2000), and of Governors leaving under stress following attempts to improve it. Sir David 
Ramsbotham’s Inspection Report of November 2000 opened with, ‘Virtually everything about this long, 
detailed and appalling report is depressing and disturbing.’ The prison had a strong local Prison Officers’ 
Association (POA) branch and a reputation for having a ‘traditional’ (negative, resistant) staff culture, or 
a staff culture that is ‘trapped in the past’ (HMCIP, 2000). A pre-transfer MQPL survey was conducted in 
May 2009. 83.8% of prisoners at Birmingham scored their overall quality of prison life negatively.  
 
Although HMP Birmingham was in obvious need of improvement, there was a sense of disbelief among 
Birmingham’s staff about the competition. Many felt that Birmingham was too large, too industrially 
powerful and ‘too dangerous a proposition for the Government to take on’. If Birmingham prison was 
transferred into private sector management, then the rules of the game would be changed irrevocably, 
leaving all public sector prisons vulnerable to future competition. As one Senior Officer put in, ‘In the 
back of all our minds, everyone thinks it won’t happen to Birmingham, it can’t, they wouldn’t dare.’8  
 
There were, however, several important ways in which HMP Birmingham was in a different position to 
Brixton. First, as the CBI’s criticism of the decision to use internal performance improvement on the Isle 
of Sheppey suggests, there was a risk that private sector interest would wane. If competition policy was 
to have long-term credibility, the threat to the public sector, and promise to the private sector, of 
takeover at some stage needed to be made real. The Government needed to demonstrate to the private 
sector that the UK prison market was worth its investment. Secondly, in the wake of the financial crisis, 
there were more pressing fiscal imperatives to achieve immediate financial savings. In this context, 
privatisation was seen as an especially attractive solution since it enables costs, and therefore risks, to 
be fixed and transferred rapidly. Thirdly, the political landscape and policy context had changed since the 
failed attempt to compete Brixton. Whilst the Birmingham competition was launched under a Labour 
Government it was completed under the Conservative/Liberal Democrat Coalition. It would have been 
surprising for the competition to have been aborted by the Coalition, given the strong alignment 
between privatisation and Conservative politics which have predominated within the Coalition. 
Furthermore, since Brixton, a more powerful prison procurement body had been created within NOMS. 
These three factors made it more likely that the Birmingham competition would be a ‘game changer’. 
The Government could not afford another failed Brixton competition.  
 
(ii) The Birmingham ‘revolution’ 
 
On 31 March 2011, after a two year procurement process, the outcome of the Birmingham competition 
was announced. As the Justice Secretary rose to address the House of Commons, the Governor read out 
the news that G4S had been awarded the contract to manage HMP Birmingham. Thereafter, the prison 
                                                                                                                                               
transition were different, not least because there is no obligation to transfer existing staff to the new operator 
under Australian employment law. 
8 These quotations are taken from a total of 60 semi-structured interviews carried out with Birmingham staff 
during the competition and transfer to G4S. See Ludlow, 2015. Later quotations are from ongoing research 
being conducted by both authors. 
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entered into a transition phase that ran until 1 October 2011, when management of the prison was 
formally transferred to G4S. 1 October 2011 was therefore an historic day. As a NOMS Senior Manager 
described, ‘The Birmingham announcement is one of the most momentous decisions in the Prison 
Service since the nationalisation of local prisons in 1876’. But in most visible respects, 1 October 2011 
was an anti-climax. There was some rebranding around the prison and staff wore a different uniform, a 
significant indicator to them of their new and, at the time, unwelcome status. But everything else 
seemed just the same as it had been.  
 
A team from the Institute of Criminology in Cambridge was invited by HMP Birmingham’s new Director 
to conduct a detailed survey and observational study of staff and prisoners’ perceptions of their quality 
of life shortly after transition to G4S in December 2011, and again, one and two years into the contract, 
in December 2012 and 2013. This invitation reflected the new Director’s genuine commitment to 
delivering improvement, but it also reflected his awareness that improving Birmingham was going to be 
a difficult task. We present the findings of this work below and consider their implications, with other 
major transitions in mind, below. Before turning to outcomes though, we reflect upon the process of 
competition and the ways in which such processes shaped prison life. We note an interesting divergence 
between perceptions of success amongst establishment staff and NOMS management in the immediate 
aftermath of the contract award announcement.  
 
Researcher:    ‘Do you think this competition has been a success?’  
 
NOMS Senior Manager:  ‘Yes it has. It’s been a clean process. Obviously the bidders that didn’t 
win weren’t pleased but everyone agrees that it was a fair process. We 
managed to avoid any leaks. Nobody knew until the Minister stood up in 
the House of Commons. That was a big achievement. We’ve proved to 
the private sector that the prisons market is worth investing in.’ 
 
Birmingham Senior Officer: ‘Success? I dunno what they were trying to achieve. Four staff were sent 
off duty during the last ten days because they were crying and shaking 
uncontrollably. We sent another two off in the last week for alcohol 
related issues. You see everyone in the car park before work psyching 
themselves up, in tears, doing their best to come into work. If that’s 
what they wanted then I guess they’ve got it yeah. We’re broken. I don’t 
know anymore.’ 
 
The Senior Manager thought that the competition had been a success because it had been ‘a clean 
process’. The decision had not been leaked before the Minister’s official announcement and the 
commercial integrity and ‘competitive neutrality’ of the competition process had been honoured. NOMS 
had demonstrated that its staff could make (controversial) procurement decisions and retain control 
until the time of official release of that information. This was taken to indicate that power now resided 
with NOMS rather than the POA and underscored the procurement team’s integrity and competence, all 
of which would give the private sector confidence to invest in future prison competitions.  
 
By contrast, the dominant view amongst Birmingham staff at all levels was that the procurement process 
had been a betrayal. As one Manager said, ‘I’m used to the Winson Green [HMP Birmingham] way of 
having a knife stuck in your back but now they’re sticking it between your eyes.’ The process had been 
emotionally and psychologically destabilising for staff. They described the process as a ‘sword’ above 
their heads, over which they had no control. Prison Officers reported that they had ‘lost their corporate 
identity’ and that ‘money rather than people now ruled the roost’. This manifested itself in decreasing 
morale and trust between staff, and increasing apathy towards their work.  
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This divergence between perceptions of success – between a manager who focused narrowly on a 
successful process outcome and a Birmingham officer who described deep trauma - tells us that 
different stakeholders have different experiences, as well as widely differing criteria, for evaluating 
‘success’. The more negative experiences of competition by staff on the ground played a constraining 
role in improving Birmingham’s future.  
 
This divergence also illustrates a more general theme that came to light in this case study, namely a 
conflict between the competition process requirements and reform objectives on the one hand, and 
fairness, or care, for employees who were affected on the other. Despite the existence of more than 30 
documents specifying principles, articulating statements of practice and offering guidance on the 
inclusion of workforce matters in procurement, this guidance did not translate into defensible staff 
experiences of competition at Birmingham. A concern to ensure that the procurement process was 
commercially rigorous was allowed to marginalise day-to-day and post-transfer workforce issues. The 
cultural improvement agenda, for which the competitive process was introduced, appeared neglected as 
a result of the focus upon procurement process. Whilst staff at Birmingham were arguably ‘culpable’ in 
culturally resisting reform, as well as bringing about or colluding with an unacceptable culture in the first 
place (which they typically cannot diagnose or recognise whilst working in it), many were willing to 
participate in improvement, and as in any prison, some had been doing outstanding work all along. The 
problem of how to challenge a workforce, overcome resistance, and then secure willing cooperation 
with a future management agenda had never been satisfactorily considered. No ‘model’ of improved 
‘delivery’ (what we might refer to as a legitimate form of order) had been articulated, to which a newly 
formed workforce could work. 
 
Competition became an end in itself rather than a process by which to secure better practices and value 
for money. This echoes Labour’s criticisms of compulsory competitive tendering (CCT): ‘All too often the 
process of competition has become an end in itself, distracting attention from the services that are 
actually provided to local people. In short, CCT has provided a poor deal for employees, employers and 
local people. CCT will therefore be abolished.’ (DETR, 1998). The way in which the law was understood 
and mobilised played a significant role in the creation of this state of affairs. Contracting in this way (that 
is, competing whole establishments, or at least competing establishments in such a protracted manner, 
specifying standard outputs but leaving the real problem areas of staff attitudes and practices, 
weaknesses in management, or unclear penology, unresolved) may not be the most suitable or effective 
way to improve services. Where the original institutional problems are primarily cultural and 
penological, the solutions need to go beyond new contractual arrangements.  
 
(iii) How competition became an end in itself  
 
Unlike private parties, when the Government chooses to put its services out to tender, it must comply 
with an additional set of public procurement rules that have their roots in European Union (EU) law. The 
Government’s fundamental obligations are to treat economic operators equally and to act in a 
transparent manner. This implies the imposition of a variety of compulsory procedural duties (such as a 
mandatory standstill period between the notification of the contract award decision and the entering 
into any contract of at least ten days) and, to some extent, constrains an authority’s choice and conduct 
of competitive procurement processes. In the case of prisons, a more limited set of rules applies, on 
grounds of an anachronistic (and now removed) distinction between so-called ‘Part A’ and ‘Part B’ 
services. Part B services, of which imprisonment is an example, are considered to be of greater local 
interest and thus of less cross-border (and therefore European) interest. Constraint authorities therefore 
enjoy greater discretion in their choice and conduct of competitive processes in these areas, albeit that 
there is still an overriding requirement to ensure equal treatment and transparency.  
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With this background in mind, it is noteworthy that NOMS considered the procurement rules to apply in 
full to the Birmingham competition and thereby denied itself some procedural latitude that it could have 
otherwise enjoyed. Such a defensive decision can be explained by both the complexity of the 
procurement rules and the high risks and penalties of non-compliance. The 2012 West Coast rail fiasco, 
in which a contract award decision was overturned following a challenge to the integrity of the bid 
evaluation procedure by one of the bidders, provides a good illustration of the financial and reputational 
risks of procurement errors.9 Competitive processes that run smoothly are already very expensive. The 
cost of running the Birmingham competition is reported to have been £5.84m (Prison Reform Trust, 
2011, p.72) and, although private bidders must cover their own bidding costs, participation expenses 
inevitably impact upon future bid pricing. Retendering adds significant further cost and sends a 
damaging signal to the market about the contracting authority’s competence. There are therefore good 
reasons for contracting authorities to tread carefully when running a competition.  
 
However, regulatory complexity can cause problems. The complexity of the procurement rules, and the 
high risks of non-compliance, contributed to the domination of process concerns over questions about 
substance (improved prison quality, culture and outcomes). Procurement was seen as a highly 
specialised function, to which few NOMS’ staff could make a contribution and which, consequently, was 
isolated organisationally. ‘Ethical walls’ were erected within NOMS to prevent the perception among 
private sector bidders of the public sector having an unfair tendering advantage. However, at times, the 
‘walls’ had prejudicial operational impacts, partly because their underlying purpose had not been 
properly explained to NOMS staff. Expertise was not always sitting on the ‘right’ side of an ethical wall, 
where it was most needed.  
 
There was a gap between the political vision of competition, as a source of rapid, inherent improvement, 
and the realities of managing such a process. Constrained by the political mandate for competition, 
NOMS did not have the power, time or foresight to reflect adequately upon what a competition of this 
nature would mean for it as an organisation financially, culturally or operationally. It did not develop a 
clear vision of what it sought to achieve by putting HMP Birmingham out to tender and did not relate 
that vision to the process of competition: ‘What the Board seemed not to realise is that the idea and 
reality of competition are actually very different. There was no consideration about the appropriate 
balancing of resource. We haven’t thought about what competition means for us as an institution. There 
is lots of responsibility sitting with not many people who are not quite sure what competition means or 
how to deliver it. It is all a bit amateurish’ (NOMS Manager). 
 
There was little appreciation of the impact that the choice of a particular competitive procedure can 
have upon the dynamics of the process and therefore the outcomes that competition produces. 
Competition was mostly understood as a generic (rather than tailor-made and strategic) process. 
Nuances between the different types of competition, such as the varying levels of discretion retained by 
the contracting authority towards the end of the process or levels of necessary advance preparation, 
were generally poorly understood. NOMS did not articulate any vision of improvement upon which the 
Procurement Directorate could draw in constructing the competition dialogue sessions and drafting the 
final contract. Discussions thus centred upon delivering existing policies and standards rather than 
securing improvements. This is reflected in the final contract which is, perhaps inevitably, an operational 
or technical, rather than vision or direction-setting, document (see more generally, Le Vay, 2016).  
 
Failing to think through the purposes of competition had a number of damaging consequences in the 
Birmingham competition. First, little thought was given to identifying Birmingham’s enduring problems, 
or considering how competition (and the particular form that was used) would address those problems. 
Rather than identifying Birmingham’s specific problems (poor management, a negative, resistant staff 
culture, an unclear penological purpose, and poor material conditions) and taking targeted action to 
                                              
9 http://www.guardian.co.uk/public-leaders-network/2012/oct/03/west-coast-rail-fiasco-procurement.  
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address them individually, the whole prison was put out to tender. This may be more straightforward 
because it transfers all risk to a new contractor. More targeted solutions (such as bringing in specific 
external expertise) require greater creativity, long-term effort and on-going negotiation of risk and cost 
allocation. An organisation must also be able to identify, with help if needed, its own strengths and 
weaknesses. Whole-sale contracting out is by no means risk free. In the Birmingham competition, 
considerable time and cost were required to ensure that basic minimum standards were replicated by 
bidders, at the expense of discussions about how the prison’s problems might be overcome.  
 
Secondly, to the limited extent that workforce transformation was considered during the Birmingham 
procurement process, the law provided only a rather blunt tool for addressing such issues as part of a 
competitive process. This was partly a result of the public procurement rules, and partly a result of the 
inherent difficulties of expressing qualitatively sophisticated visions of ‘right staff-prisoner relationships’ 
or ‘progressive management cultures’ as contract terms.  
 
The procurement rules frustrate efforts to bring about workforce transformation because they exert 
significant pressure upon contracting authorities to specify their service requirements in output terms. 
This is a manifestation of the non-discrimination rationale that underpins the rules: so long as a 
contracting authority receives the final good or service that it needs, bidders should have maximum 
discretion about how that good or service is delivered, so that tenderers from a wide variety of national 
contexts can compete. Improvements in output measures for prisoners (such as percentage of prisoners 
attending education or work) may be an indication of workforce improvements, but they paint only a 
partial picture. If workforce matters are not adequately included in the contract, the contracting 
authority is reliant upon the contractor’s discretion in making workforce changes. Furthermore, since 
contracts are key to holding contractors to account, if workforce matters are unspecified, it is difficult for 
the contracting authority to police the contractor’s performance. 
 
The procurement rules can also make it difficult for contracting authorities to mandate minimum 
standards exceeding statutory minima in respect of workforce related processes. A contracting authority 
cannot demand that a contractor pays all staff a living wage, beyond the statutory minimum. This is 
because the European Commission takes the view that such clauses are not ‘connected with the subject 
matter of the contract’. They do not alter the function or performance of the service that is provided: 
there are no functional differences between tables manufactured by labour paid a living wage or labour 
paid the statutory minimum wage.  
 
Notwithstanding literature demonstrating that a fairly treated workforce makes good business sense 
and increases growth (e.g., Deakin & Sarkar, 2008), the European Commission’s view is that labour 
standards are a product of economic development but do not of themselves contribute to economic 
development. This view runs counter to British Government statements about the strong correlation 
between high quality employment practices and high quality services (see, for example, OGC, 2006, p.3; 
ODPM, 2003, p.37). There is strong evidence about the centrality of staff-prisoner relationships and the 
quality of management teams to prison quality and performance (Crewe et al., 2011; Liebling, 2011). 
There is also evidence that employment rights, practices and processes play an important role in shaping 
occupational cultures and identities (e.g. Sachdev, 2001). If staff feel ignored, devalued, demotivated 
and unfairly treated or rewarded, that is likely to affect their attitudes and performance.  
 
Although the public sector prison employment model has weaknesses (such as unduly cumbersome 
performance management processes), it also has strengths, which a contracting authority might wish to 
retain, such as loyalty, commitment, workforce stability, experience and a sense of vocation or public 
service ethos. The public procurement rules make it difficult for a contracting authority to adopt a 
position on workforce matters during competitive processes. This makes it less likely that the strengths 
of the public sector will be retained.  
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The third and, at the time of the Birmingham competition, most visibly damaging, consequence of 
competition ‘becoming an end in itself’, was the demoralising and disempowering manner in which the 
process was experienced by Birmingham staff. Inadequate preparation for the process resulted in 
multiple delays. A process that was intended to be concluded within less than a year took over two 
years. Such a lengthy and costly process risks unhealthy market dominance by large providers as small 
and medium enterprises are squeezed out, displacing the potential innovation and creativity they might 
bring, and replacing one (public) monopoly with another (private) monopoly. The protracted process 
was psychologically burdensome for staff. Distrust, anger, and disillusionment bred, as did feelings of 
professional devaluation and apathy. Staff suspected a ‘stitch up’, as the competition process stalled to 
take into account new (mostly disadvantageous) staffing policy developments, such as a review of 
pension protection for transferred public sector staff.  
 
The damage that arose from the length of the process was compounded by NOMS’ neglect of its on-
going responsibilities as an employer. Nobody spoke to staff in a language that they could understand. 
The POA was torn between a position of principled non-engagement with competition because of its 
objection to the policy and the realities of what their membership were experiencing: ‘We get some 
information about the bid and stuff from the POA. But it’s not in normal language, you can’t understand 
it. It’s in union speak’ (Birmingham Prison Officer). This information void was unwittingly (and 
inappropriately) filled by the public sector bid team, who provided staff with general information about 
the process and its progress. When this team was disbanded, following a change to the competition 
process, no alternative arrangements for staff engagement were put in place.  
 
This lack of information and support for staff had far-reaching effects, some of which occurred beyond 
Birmingham, in reshaping the texture and values of public sector prison employment relationships. As 
argued above, there may be some benefit to remodelling this relationship (for example, in making it 
more ‘contractual’) and, in so doing, drawing on some of the strengths of the private sector. But this also 
has risks. In our work at Birmingham since privatisation, we have seen how the negative experiences of 
staff during the competition constrained improvement, particularly during the early years of the new 
contract. G4S inherited a group of staff and managers who felt devalued, alienated, and ‘tarred’ by 
working for a ‘failing’ public sector institution. These staff were now responsible for delivering HMP 
Birmingham’s promised improvement. A promising feature of Birmingham’s development from this 
point onwards was the very able, ex-public sector Director who, having been asked to lead the prison 
through its transition stage, was persuaded to transfer to G4S as its new Director. This was a challenging 
decision for him, but his leadership proved to be a critical factor in what followed. 
 
Outcomes 
 
Our three year quality of life study at HMP Birmingham began shortly after the prison’s transfer to G4S 
and concluded in December 2013 (Liebling et al., 2015).10 The team conducted detailed surveys of staff 
and prisoners’ quality of life (known as MQPL11 and SQL12) alongside interviews and observation at all 
three stages. Three year mean data for all prisoner and staff quality of life dimensions can be found in 
tables 1 and 2. 
 
At time 1, December 2011, HMP Birmingham was performing poorly. The prison was characterised by 
long-serving and highly experienced staff who had been operating a well-oiled, but restricted regime. 
                                              
10 The team consisted of Alison Liebling, Bethany Schmidt, Ben Crewe, Katherine Auty, Ruth Armstrong, 
Thomas Akoensi, Deborah Kant, Amy Ludlow and Alice levins. We are grateful to the team for their 
contributions to the project. 
11 Measuring the Quality of Prison Life; see Liebling, Crewe and Hulley, 2011. 
12 Measuring Staff Quality of Life; see Liebling, Price and Shefer, 2011. 
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The senior management team (SMT) reflected this traditional character, consisting almost exclusively of 
older men, with operational backgrounds. Trust in the SMT was low, following the protracted bid 
process, but staff were willing to give the former public sector Director a chance and many expressed 
confidence in him. Staff-prisoner relationships were mixed, and were very poor on some wings. Overall 
prisoner quality of life was low (evaluated at 3.99 by prisoners overall on a ten point scale). The ‘moral 
balance’ at Birmingham was heavily weighted in favour of security rather than relationships (Liebling 
with Arnold, 2004). Many staff in the prison were keen to improve the prison’s performance but the bid 
process had damaged professional confidence and feelings of investment in their work. Many staff 
expressed lack of clarity about the direction of travel or confidence that they had the right ‘tools to do 
the job’. Staff had understood only one part of the message the procurement process was intended to 
communicate: that the way they had worked in the past was ‘wrong’. As described above, there had not 
been any attempt to articulate or retain the public sector’s core strengths, which include, at its best, the 
professional use of authority (see Crewe et al., 2014). The bid process had left a powerful legacy but, at 
time 1, it was uncertain whether an improved Birmingham would ‘rise from the ashes’.  
 
By time 2, December 2012, there were some significant improvements in prisoners’ evaluations of their 
quality of life (albeit from a low level), over a relatively short period of time, particularly in levels of 
respect shown by staff towards prisoners. Most of the MQPL scores had moved in a positive direction. 
However, on the whole, these improvements to prisoner quality of life were not being led 
enthusiastically by staff. They were, rather, partly the result of perceived losses in staff power and some 
retreats from direct engagement with prisoners. Staff were emotionally fraught at the time of the 
second research visit, which coincided with a programme of voluntary redundancies. Drops in SQL scores 
reflected this. The eagerness of staff for change and their willingness to adopt a new agenda had waned, 
as they reported fatigue from multiple alterations to their working practices and numbers, with little 
support or clear leadership. Many staff retreated into offices, away from their work on wings, absorbed 
by their own ‘private troubles’. The prison was disorderly and some powerful prisoners were exerting 
their authority on the wings. A drop in prisoners’ rating of ‘policing and security’ reflected this. The 
prison had not combined the strengths of public and private sector prison staffing and management 
models, and nor had anyone leading the process articulated this possibility. Instead it was showing some 
of the weaknesses of each sector (negative staff attitudes towards prisoners and management and 
underuse of authority respectively). A change in the power balance between staff and prisoners, linked 
to lower resourcing, was evident (and has been replicated elsewhere). The reports written for 
Birmingham’s senior management team were taken seriously, and concerted efforts were made to 
engage prisoners and the remaining (and therefore more committed) staff in the development of a safer 
and more constructive regime. Critically, at this point, staff in the public sector faced a reduction in their 
pay, numbers and conditions in a ‘deal’ that would avoid further wholesale privatisation but introduce 
much lower staffing levels in public sector prisons. Staff in Birmingham were awarded a pay rise above 
that negotiated by the public sector. The tables had turned. 
 
By time 3, December 2013, there had been a turnaround. The prison was now showing signs of 
consistent improvement. Both prisoners and staff rated their quality of life and treatment significantly 
better than in 2011 and 2012 (time 3 overall quality of life scores were 4.75 and 5.93 respectively), and 
were feeling as though their prison ‘was finally settling down’. Staff felt more secure in their jobs and 
described their work environment as more stable. Some staff had come to see the competition process 
more positively in light of the far-reaching restructuring taking place at public sector prisons from which 
Birmingham was shielded for at least 15 years by virtue of G4S’ management contract with NOMS (‘the 
grass is no longer greener on the other side’). Staff were starting to feel ably led and had started to grasp 
the bigger picture. 
 
Staff views of senior management at time 3 were positive, though some complaints about insufficient 
recognition and support persisted. Feelings of safety, control and security among staff were positive, for 
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the first time, although there were still concerns about the new flow of power among prisoners in a 
leanly staffed establishment and its under-policing by staff. Some staff continued to express concerns for 
safety linked to their reduced staffing numbers. ‘Power-sharing’ with prisoners was becoming the norm. 
There had been some symbolically significant and (in the research team’s view) well-judged promotions 
of senior officers to junior managers. Highly talented and committed staff members were beginning to 
set a new tone in the prison and professional orientations of staff towards prisoners were improved. 
Prisoners noticed and appreciated these changes. 14 of the 21 MQPL dimensions received a more 
favourable rating in 2013 than in 2012, of which two were statistically significant: ‘family contact’ 
improved from 2.99 to 3.22 (p<0.05) and ‘care for the vulnerable’ (prisoners at risk of suicide, self-harm 
or bullying from others) improved from 2.95 to 3.09 (p<0.1). The prison was (just) moving over the 
threshold from overall negative to overall positive ratings. 
 
Overall, although several of the problems arising in the 2011 and 2012 studies reappeared, staff and 
prisoners were optimistic that Birmingham was on a positive trajectory. There was observational 
evidence to support perceptions of improvement. By comparison to the 2011 MQPL data, seven prisoner 
quality of life dimensions had improved significantly by 2013: ‘respect/courtesy’, ‘humanity’, ‘decency’, 
‘care for the vulnerable’, ‘staff-prisoner relationships’, ‘fairness’ and ‘personal autonomy’. Five of these 
are ‘harmony’ dimensions, suggesting that relationships – the interpersonal treatment of prisoners – had 
undergone the most significant improvement since transition in 2011. This suggested a real cultural shift. 
The staff who remained at Birmingham (who ‘survived the transition’) were by now committed to its 
future and those who had strongly resisted change had mostly moved on. The Director remained 
committed to the prison’s future improvement, and staff were beginning to trust him and his team. 
Significantly, staff could see that since 2011, pay and conditions had become better in the private sector 
than in the public sector, as a result of stringent public sector savings programmes and dramatic 
reorganisations of prison work. Staff looked out at their public sector counterparts with some relief. We 
found turbulence, and less settled reconfigurations, in some public sector prisons in the period to follow 
(see, e.g. Justice Committee, 2015) – this is another story we hope to tell in the future. Stated briefly, 
better questions need to be asked about how cost, quality and legitimacy are traded off in the changing 
prison (Le Vay, 2016) and about why more use of cheaper imprisonment is preferred to less use of a 
better kind. 
 
Conclusions 
 
The questions raised in this article are sociological-penological and political. Changing legal, managerial, 
economic and political frameworks are impacting deeply and swiftly on prison life, culture and quality in 
England and Wales, with some risks to legitimacy, order and well-being, and some gaps in 
understanding. The new model of penal order is cheaper per prisoner place, but costly in relation to 
numbers imprisoned and risks faced. It takes very hard work and considerable skill to make the model 
work. One conceptual error has been in imagining a failing prison to be just that. To construct a process 
from an unstated but powerful set of assumptions about how the ‘public sector has failed’, and the 
‘private sector has the answers’ omits to carry with it the significant strengths visible in public sector 
prison work (pride, loyalty, public service, experience and the competent use of authority). It 
underestimates some of the weaknesses inherent in private sector operations (cheap staff, high 
turnover, lack of loyalty, inexperience, and a drift into criminal justice work rather than a vocation). 
Some of these weaknesses are now being replicated in the public sector. The legal framework, and the 
ways in which the law was understood and mobilised, may have exacerbated a tendency to pay 
insufficient attention to the detail of workforce motivation, performance and culture. In addition, there 
is a lack of clarity about what the model of the aspired better prison is, what its underlying penological 
rationale might be, and what form of order any serious attempt at ‘rehabilitation’ rests upon. We 
followed the transition process with some alarm in the early days, and offered those who cared about 
Birmingham’s future some constructive feedback based on our analysis when we could. We, like others, 
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‘hope the Prison Service has learned from the experience of staff at Birmingham, and that no other 
prison will be subject to such a lengthy process. We would also like to think that there is now much more 
consultation with staff, including an explanation of what privatisation [or competition] actually means.’ 
(Bradbury, 2012, pp. 12-13). Transformative processes, whether involving wholesale or partial 
competition, bring about huge risks, complex human consequences, and some very difficult 
management challenges. Prisoners and staff are the unwitting subjects of penal experimentation. Better 
use of planning, penological honesty, and evidence-gathering on how far the new model achieves 
legitimate day-to-day experience, might avoid some of the more brutal consequences for staff and 
prisoners, might lead to a greater willingness to deploy much needed skill and determination to bring 
about the required improvement, and might expose greater awareness of the gap between rhetoric and 
reality. These transitions are a test case of whether and how the State can use its power legitimately. 
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Table 1: Prisoner dimension mean comparisons – ANOVA test for linear trend 2011 to 2013 
 
 HMP Birmingham - Prisoners13   
 N=111 N=142 N=164 
 2011 2012 2013 
Harmony Dimensions 
Entry into Custody 2.55 2.72 2.64 
Respect/courtesy  2.91 3.13     3.21 ** 
Staff-prisoner relationships 2.91 3.07    3.11 ϯ 
Humanity  2.76 2.90   2.97 * 
Decency 2.54 2.63   2.73 * 
Care for the vulnerable 2.90 2.95   3.09 * 
Help and assistance  2.85 2.92 2.95 
Professionalism Dimensions 
Staff professionalism  3.14 3.20 3.13 
Bureaucratic legitimacy 2.59 2.62 2.57 
Fairness 2.60 2.70    2.77 ϯ 
Organisation and consistency 2.46 2.49 2.61 
Security Dimensions 
                                              
13 ϯ <0.1; * < 0.05; ** < 0.01; *** < 0.001; mean scores of 3.00 (the ‘neutral’ threshold) or over are shaded. 
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Policing and security 3.13 2.97 3.02 
Prisoner safety  3.16 3.23 3.23 
Prisoner adaptation 3.34 3.30 3.24 
Drugs and exploitation 2.71 2.74 2.66 
Conditions and Family Contact Dimensions  
Conditions 3.18 3.22 3.25 
Family contact 3.19 2.99 3.22 
Wellbeing and Development Dimensions 
Personal development 2.68 2.73 2.77 
Personal autonomy 2.71 2.89    2.86 ϯ 
Wellbeing 2.56 2.56 2.63 
Distress 3.41 3.36 3.34 
    
    
Quality of life score (1-10) mean 3.99 4.44 4.75 
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Table 2: All staff dimension mean comparisons – 2011 compared to 2012, and 2012 compared to 201314  
HMP Birmingham - All staff15   
  N=165 N=126  N=126 N=131 
 2011 2012  2012 2013 
Management Dimensions     
Attitudes towards the Director   3.27  3.01*  3.01      3.55 *** 
Attitudes towards the SMT  2.66 2.59  2.59      3.07 *** 
Treatment by senior management  3.11 2.98  2.98      3.32 ** 
Treatment by line management  3.13 3.07  3.07      3.60 *** 
Relationships with line management  3.47 3.45  3.45      3.80 *** 
Job Satisfaction Dimensions     
Relationship with the organisation       3.12  2.51***  2.51      3.10 *** 
Commitment       3.64  3.13***  3.13      3.44 ** 
Recognition and personal efficacy  2.75 2.70  2.70      3.11 *** 
Involvement and motivation      3.60 3.30**  3.30      3.66 *** 
Stress      2.48  2.24**  2.24      2.46 * 
Relationships with peers  3.67 3.74  3.74      3.83 
Authority Dimensions     
Safety, control and security       2.91  2.39***  2.39      3.13 *** 
Punishment and discipline      2.84 2.58**  2.58      2.80 * 
Dynamic authority  3.38 3.27  3.27      3.24 
Prisoner Orientation Dimensions     
Professional support for prisoners  3.68 3.57  3.57      3.74 * 
Positive attitudes to prisoners  2.78 2.73  2.73      2.87 
Trust, compassion and commitment towards prisoners  3.76 3.69  3.69      3.73 
Relationships with prisoners  3.69 3.59  3.59      3.72 ϯ 
Overall Quality of Life score (1-10 mean)      5.52  4.47***  4.47 5.93 *** 
 
                                              
14 An ANOVA test for linear trends with all staff revealed that only one dimension had consistently moved in an upward direction from 2011 (most went down, then up): ‘Relationships with 
peers’ increased from 3.67 in 2011 to 3.83 (p<0.05) in 2013. 
15 ϯ <0.1; * < 0.05; ** < 0.01; *** < 0.001; mean scores of 3.00 (the ‘neutral’ threshold) or over are shaded. 
